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Employer Sanctions and Other Labor Market
Restrictions on Alien Employment: The
"Scorched Earth" Approach to Immigration
Control
by Charles Duryea Smith* and
Juan Ernesto Mendez**
I.

Introduction

The United States has experienced a new wave of immigration during the past few years. Immigration is a deep-rooted part of America's
history, yet it presents today a somewhat different face. Large proportions of the recent non-European arrivals are refugees fleeing persecution
in their homelands. An unverifiable number of others enter without inspection or are nonimmigrants who overstay their visas and wish to remain permanently. The presence of these aliens against the backdrop of
the United States' current economic problems has spotlighted the debate
over U.S. immigration policies as a fundamental and pressing issue facing the nation. The debate is likely to become increasingly heated and to
involve diverse organizations and individuals who previously have not
voiced opinions on immigration because, in 1978, the Congress and the
President created the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy and charged it with analyzing immigration impacts and formulating recommendations for reform in the area.I The Select Commission
will report to the Congress and the President by March 1981.2 RegardSpecial Assistant to Chairman, Senator Spark M. Matsunga (D-Hawaii), United States
Commission on Proposals for the National Academy of Peace and Conflict Resolution; Legal
Consultant, Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, 1979-1980; A.B. 1964,
Oberlin College; M.A. English Literature 1967, Washington University, Saint Louis; J.D. 1972,
Boston University.
** Alien Rights Law Project Staff, Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law; Board of Directors, Amnesty International-U.S.A.; Abogado 1970, Catholic University, Mar del Plata, Argentina.
I Immigration and Nationality Act-Refugee Policy, Pub. L. No. 95-412, § 4, 92 Stat.
907 (1978) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1151 note (Supp. II 1979)).
*

2 SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, UNITED STATES IMMI-

GRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST (March 1981). The report was released just
before this article went to print. The proposals in this article differ from many of those proposed by the Commission, so it should be referred to especially in the area of Employer Sanctions, which the Commission recommended.
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less of its recommendations, termination of the Select Commission will
resituate immigration policy squarely in the public arena.
Broadly speaking, the federal government controls migration into
the United States by concentrating on three places. First, to create legality and to prevent illegality, it erects barriers outside the United States
by requiring visas for foreign visitors and immigrants, establishing their
terms and conditions, and then screening applicants. Second, the government places control mechanisms at the border by designating certain
locations, including interior international airports, as ports of entry at
which all foreign arrivals are inspected for legal admission and by patrolling the land borders to apprehend persons trying to enter undetected.
Third, the government operates in the interior of the United States to
apprehend persons in the country illegally and to deter them and others
from entering and staying in contravention of the law. It is this third
area of interior deterrence which this article addresses.
Immigration policy is not stated and implemented solely through
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 3 Reform efforts should
therefore encompass more than the overhaul of that Act. For instance,
immigration policies are shaped indirectly by many local, state, and federal regulatory policies and by state and federal court decisions in addition to the practices of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS). The result is a frequently unintentional but verifiable extension
of immigration enforcement responsibilities to other sectors of society.
This extension is evident, for example, in enforcement of immigration
laws by state and local police, in restrictions placed on the availability to
noncitizens of government benefits based on need, and in the obligation
of Food Stamps adjudicators to report to INS the information obtained
from applicants regarding their status if legality is in doubt. 4 The labor
market, however, is the immediate arena for this extension of enforcement responsibilities. There are a variety of measures, proposed or already in effect, that restrict access to certain jobs or force labor market
participants into investigative and enforcement functions.
The dominant motivation behind this diffusion of investigative and
enforcement functions is apparently the discouragement of immigration,
both legal and illegal, by enlisting untrained official and private citizen
efforts in the detection of aliens who may be present in the United States
in violation of the law. This philosophy can be described as a "scorched
earth" approach to controlling immigration, closing doors on immigrants
and discouraging them from exercising rights while simultaneously placing enforcement responsibility to an alarming degree in the hands of a
growing number of government agents and private individuals.
3 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101-1503 (West 1970 & Supp. 1980).

4 7 U.S.C.A. § 2020(e)

(West

1973 & Supp. 1980). In addition, persons applying for a

new social security card or a replacement have been required since 1978 to submit documentary
evidence of age, identity, and citizenship or lawful alien status. 20 C.F.R. §§ 422.107, 422.110
(1980); 43 Fed. Reg. 20,973, 20,975 (1978).
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The term "scorched earth" is not an exaggeration, for the practices
and proposals are meant explicitly to deprive those noncitizens, whose
presence or activities in the United States are in fact or in perception not
sanctioned by law, of the means to obtain food, shelter, clothing, education, and medical care and also to deprive them of protection from exploitation, violence, and invasion of privacy. These policies are
animated by the assumptions that foreign migration to the United States
is an acute crisis not unlike war and that the Constitution should permit
distinctions between citizens and aliens, the latter receiving no more than
minimal due process. These assumptions exist, despite the fact that the
Constitution nearly always speaks in the inclusive term of "persons"
rather than the exclusive term of "citizens." These assumptions are dangerous. A crisis mentality, particularly one without a firm analytical
foundation, risks not only damage to the American heritage of respect for
human rights and of constitutional freedoms but also a reversion to the
attitudes of less civilized periods in American history such as attitudes
which resulted in the Alien and Sedition Acts and the notorious Palmer
raids. "Scorched earth" policies will therefore undermine trust and move
the nation toward isolationism and fear.
The following five topics will illustrate the "scorched earth" approach to immigration policy and what are at best ambivalent policies
toward noncitizens. The topics are labor certification of applicants for
permanent residency, discrimination by private employers, the policies
governing access by immigrants to state public employment and also to
federal public employment, and proposals for employer sanctions for hiring illegal aliens. As will be seen, the topics are interrelated in that ambivalent attitudes and an "us versus them" mentality are necessary parts
5
of the "scorched earth" policy.
Nevertheless, it is true that there is a clear need to control migration
into the United States. There are more foreigners who wish to live in the
United States than can be accepted. Therefore, there must be an immigration policy to choose those whom the United States will permit to
enter and live within the country.
Despite the tremendous pressures from worldwide population
growth, the fears of Americans beset by inflation and unemployment
should not be projected on foreigners. It is particularly important today
that immigration and its control be placed in proper perspective so that
it does not dominate other concerns of U.S. society. Thus, it is particularly troubling to observe the drift toward enforcement of immigration
policies, but not immigration laws per se, by federal, state, and local
5 For reasons of space availability, we will only address some of the more egregious aspects of this connection between the labor market and enforcement of immigration policy. It
would doubtless be of substantial interest to explore other aspects of this policy, such as the
restrictions on unemployment insurance and on employment training benefits.
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agencies and departments other than the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Beyond this impact on the profile of American society, the immigration laws of the United States represent short-run responses to global
problems which must be addressed by all nations. Though the United
States must reject the concept of opening its doors to all who want to
enter, as that would constitute an abdication of sovereignty, it cannot
wall itself off from the rest of the world. Because the pressure to migrate
to the United States is considered stronger in Third and Fourth World
nations, it is that pressure that U.S. policies must address. The United
States must join with other nations to address the problems of population
growth, a fair and equitable distribution of resources, balanced economic
development, and human rights, because these forces promote international migration of persons. Otherwise, persons from lesser developed
countries will increasingly seek to migrate to the United States, and this
nation will increasingly use "scorched earth" policies to stem the tide.
Only by addressing causes of international migration on a global scale
instead of merely parochially can the vicious cycle be avoided.
II.

Labor Certification of Applicants for Permanent Residence

The impact of foreign immigration upon the U.S. labor market is a
major immigration policy concern. 6 Nonquota immigrants, 7 based primarily on a family relationship to a U.S. citizen, are not subject to an
impact on labor test or any national, hemispheric, or global annual numerical ceiling. Other "family reunification" categories, first,8 second, 9
fourth,' 0 and fifth preferences,I for certain relatives of U.S. citizens and
permanent residents, are subject to hemispheric and country-specific annual ceilings, but not to an impact on labor test. For the remaining immigrant visas that are numerically limited, 12 third preference for
professionals, scientists, and artists,' 3 and sixth preference for skilled and
unskilled laborers, 14 a prerequisite for visa issuance is a Department of
Labor (DOL) certification obtained by the prospective employer. The
labor certification indicates a specific labor market need and that there
6 Most immigrants receive visas under either the family reunification or refugee provisions. Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.SC.A. § 1157 (West Supp. 1980).
7 Nonquota immigrants are "special immigrants" as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)
(1976), and spouses and children of U.S. citizens and parents of U.S. citizens over 21, 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1151(a)-(b) (West 1970 & Supp. 1980).
8 8 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a)(1) (West Supp. 1980).
9 Id § 1153(a)(2).
10 Id. § 1153(a)(4).
'IId § 1153(a)(5).
12 The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, sets an annual worldwide ceiling
of 270,000, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1151(a) (West Supp. 1980); an annual quota of 20,000 for any nation,
which includes 600 for a colony, id § I152(a),(c); and establishes six preference classes with
worldwide percentage distribution limits and a nonpreference class, id § 1153(a).
13 Id § 1153(a)(3).
"4 Id § 1153(a)(6).
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will be no adverse effect on domestic wages and working conditions. 15
Although third and sixth preference visas each have a maximum
allocation of ten percent of the total number of preference visas issued,
"fewer than five percent of the immigrants presently in the United States
have become so by means of labor certification."' 6 In 1978, only six percent of legal immigrants entered without reference to family relationships.17 Thus, as a mechanism to protect the domestic labor force, labor
certification is essentially ineffective and costly.' 8 In the last fiscal year,
the DOL spent over $4.7 million to administer the program.' 9 In addition, much time is spent by some 8,000 state and local officials in reviewing labor certification applications and making preliminary judgments
concerning the potential impact on the U.S. labor market. Processing
time varies from region to region, ranging from two and one-half months
in one state employment service to nine months in another. 20 After the
labor certification process is completed, a third or sixth preference application will take a year to process through the INS and the appropriate
consular post abroad. 2 1
It is not surprising, then, that most applications for labor certification are filed on behalf of employees who are already in the United
States working in the jobs they seek to have certified. The procedure
thus becomes, in effect, a "selective amnesty" for certain undocumented
workers. According to a DOL 1976 report, fifty-seven percent of the immigrants with labor certifications changed not only jobs but also occupations within two years of their arrival. 22 This fact tends to support the
view that the labor certification procedure affords no real protection for
the domestic labor market. Moreover, the long and elaborate application procedures require the active participation of employer-applicants,
who are thus in a position to determine employees' legal or illegal immigration status by filing, withdrawing, or not actively pursuing employees'
applications.
The present labor certification procedures should be replaced by a
more rational, cost-efficient method of correlating the level of immigration entries with the needs of the U.S. labor market. The INS should
maintain a periodically revised schedule of occupations for which there is
an oversupply of labor in the United States. Applicants with bona fide
15 Id § 1182(a)(14).
16 SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, SEMIANNUAL REPORT

TO CONGRESS 41 (March 1980) (testimony of Aaron Bodin, Chief, Division of Labor Certification, U.S. Dep't of Labor).
17 Select Commission on Immigration & Refugee Policy, Working Paper, Restructuring

the Preference System: Goals, Categories and Immigrant Characteristics I (April 17, 1980).
18 Wildes, The Department of Labor.- Toward a Sound Approach to Labor Certifation, AMERICAN
COUNCIL FOR NATIONALITIES SERVICE, 57 INTERPRETER RELEASES, July 24, 1980, at 357.
19 Id.
20 Id
21
22

Id at 358.
Id at 359.
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offers ofjobs which do not appear on the list would be eligible to obtain a
visa under the third or sixth preferences, provided there are enough visa
numbers available under those categories for their countries of origin.
An applicant whose occupation is included in the schedule should be
allowed to obtain an exemption from the list if the employer can show
that he has been unable to fill the vacancy with qualified workers already
in the United States. Exemption procedures would thus be substantially
similar to the present system of certification. The proposed system would
simplify admissions when their impact on labor is predetermined to be
nondetrimental. At the same time it would allow for flexibility in individual cases as long as the interested parties can show that their specific
cases will not violate the principle behind labor certification of avoiding
detrimental impacts on the U.S. labor force due to immigration.
In addition, because the present labor certification system is disproportionately weighed in favor of more highly educated immigrants, the
system encourages the continuing migration of professionals from Third
World nations to the United States.2 3 This draining effect can be
avoided by the simplified system proposal as long as the schedules of
professions and occupations are carefully drawn and accurately reflect
U.S. labor needs.
By a costly and inefficient mechanism, the current procedures for
labor certification provide no real protection for the labor force and,
more significantly, discourage aliens who are eligible for immigration
benefits from applying for them because of the long delays and high costs
in attorneys' fees, publications, and other procedures involved. An otherwise eligible alien also has the burden of finding an employer willing to
wait for several months before hiring him and also willing to go through
the bureaucratic procedures that labor certification demands. In this
manner, current regulatory requirements operate as stumbling blocks for
immigrants and become part of an overriding policy of using the labor
market to impose unnecessary restrictions on their admission to the
United States.
Thus, improvements could be had through the proposed system of
maintaining an updated roster of occupational supply, noting those occupations for which jobs are scarce and which require protection from
further competition. The proposed system would enable DOL's resources to be more efficiently used and would streamline this part of the
immigration system. At the same time, the proposed system would promote the policy behind the present system, protection of the U.S. labor
force from undue competition.
III.

Private Employment Discrimination
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits
23 See, e.g.,

8 U.S.C. § 1182(j)(1)(c) (Supp. 1 1977), on the return home of medical trainees.
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discriminatory treatment of aliens in state public employment opportunities. Yick Wo v. Hopkins24 and Truax V.Ralch 25 established that aliens
are persons within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment and that
their right to work is protected as a matter of property by the due process
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. It is also long established, however, that those constitutional provisions do not reach discrimination of a purely private nature. Nevertheless, federal statutes
have made it illegal to discriminate privately on the basis of race, religion, or national origin with respect to employment.
Two major statutes proscribe such private employment discrimination. First, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196426 forbids discrimination in hiring and promotion practices by private employers on the basis
of national origin, among other reasons. In Espznoza V.Farah Manufactur1ng Co. ,27 however, the Supreme Court held that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination by employers on the basis of alienage. Espinoza was
a permanent resident alien who was denied employment by Farah because of a company policy against the employment of aliens. The Court
defined national origin as "the country where a person was born, or more
broadly, from which his ancestors came."'28 Farah employed many citizens who, like Espinoza, were of Mexican origin; thus, Espinoza could
only allege discrimination based on alienage and not nationality. Based
on the legislative history of Title VII, the Court found no congressional
intent to make discrimination against aliens in private employment unlawful. Consequently, it held that the term "national origin" does not
embrace citizenship requirements. This holding has been uniformly interpreted by the lower courts as meaning that Title VII affords no protection to 29aliens against employment discrimination based on
citizenship.
The other federal statute dealing with discrimination is section 1981
of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, which provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
30
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

The Supreme Court has not yet reached the question of whether section
24 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

25 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
26 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
27 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
28 Id at 88.
29 Garcia v. Gloor, 609 F.2d 156, 162 (5th Cir.), vacated, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980)

(forbidding a bilingual employee to speak anything but English in public areas while on the job
is not discrimination based on national origin); Dowling v. United States, 476 F. Supp. 1018,
1022 (D. Mass. 1979); Novak v. World Bank, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1166, 1167 (D.D.C.

1979).
30 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
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1981 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of alienage, but it
has explicitly applied section 1981 to purely private discrimination based
31
on race.
In the lower courts, it seems well settled that section 1981 prohibits
some types of discrimination in employment. 32 The courts are widely
split, however, on what bases of discrimination section 1981 prohibits.
33
Some have said that it only protects against racial discrimination.
Other courts have decided explicitly that section 1981 does not apply to
discrimination on the basis of national origin. 3 4 In at least one case,
however, there is dicta to the effect that the statute reaches alienage. 35
In La Fore v. Emblem Tape and Label Co. ,36 the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado rejected the notion that section 1981
applies only to racial discrimination and held squarely that the statute
applies to a private employer who has discriminated against a MexicanAmerican on the basis of his Spanish surname. The court stated that "if
plaintiff can prove that an identifiable class of which he is not a member
receives more favorable treatment than plaintiff because of that class distinction, then plaintiff is entitled to the protection of § 1981. 3 7 In two
other cases on this issue in which lower courts have discussed the legislative history of section 1981, opposite holdings were reached. In De Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors,38 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California held that section
1981 has neither the intent nor the effect of prohibiting private employment discrimination on the basis of alienage. In Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp. ,39 however, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit found, on the basis of the trial court's detailed analysis of the
40
legislative history, that section 1981 has such an intent.
If the Supreme Court settles this dispute, it will most likely put its
decision in line with its holding in Espinoza and determine that section
1981 does not prohibit private discrimination on the basis of alienage. In
31 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975); Jones v. Alfred H.

Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438-39 (1968).
32 Young v. ITT,438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d
476 (7th Cir.), cert.
dented, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
33 Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, 593 F.2d 968, 972 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding, however,
that alleged discrimination on the basis of Spanish surnames amounts to racial discrimination
for being nonwhite); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976).
34 Saad v. Burns, 456 F. Supp. 33, 37 (D.D.C. 1978); Budinsky v. Corning Glass Work, 425
F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Jones v. United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1, 15 (E.D.
Pa. 1975).
35 Holton v. Crozer-Chester, 419 F. Supp. 334, 336 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
36 448 F. Supp. 824 (D. Colo. 1978). See also
Manzanares v. Safeway Stores, 593 F.2d 968,
972 (10th Cir. 1979).
37 448 F. Supp. at 826.
38 438 F. Supp. 1121, 1142 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
39 498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974).
40 Id at 653-54. The same court later said that discrimination against Mexicans in Guerra
had strong racial overtones. Campbell v. Gadsden County Dist. School Bd., 534 F.2d 650, 654
n.8 (5th Cir. 1976).
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the meantime, the widespread practice of restricting employment access
or promotions to citizens while denying them to lawful permanent residents continues unabated. Relegating lawful permanent residents to a
second-class category regarding employment opportunities not only results in an unfair treatment of permanent residents but also discourages
immigration.
Therefore, attorneys have suggested that Congress rewrite section
1981 to make clear that it reaches all forms of discrimination, whether
public or private, including that based on citizenship. 41 Federal legislation in this area is necessary to protect a discrete and insular minority
and to establish uniformity in the field. The purpose of the proposed
amendment would be to establish nationally uniform conditions of admission to and residence in the United States to be applied to all noncitizens. The new statute obviously would not prohibit discrimination on
the basis of status; it is legitimate for employers to refuse to hire aliens
not duly authorized to accept employment. If alienage is th sole basis
for discriminatory action, however, the amendment should allow an
alien to bring a claim against the employer regardless of that alien's immigration status. Therefore, section 1981 should be amended to add the
42
following sections:
(b)

"All persons"
as used in paragraph (a) shall include citizens and
43
noncitizens;

(c) "Contracts" as used in paragraph (a) shall include contracts for employment, whether in the public or private sector, with employers
employing more than - workers;
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to conflict with regulathe employment of
tions which may be promulgated regarding
44

noncitizens in the federal civil service.

Although both Title VII and section 1981 could be amended, a
modification of the latter is preferable, mainly because the case law
under section 1981 is unsettled and there is some judicial precedent for
the proposition that section 1981 prohibits private employment discrimination based on alienage. In addition, section 1981 covers a broader
range of conduct than Title VII, going beyond employment into contracting. Procedurally, section 1981 provides immediate access to federal
45
courts without requiring a prior exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Section 1981 also offers plaintiffs broader remedies than Title VII in that
47
46
back-pay damages are not limited to a two year period, and punitive
and compensatory damages for humiliation, embarrassment, and mental
41 Memorandum from P. Thompson to L. Low, Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act and
Discrimination by Private Employers on the Basis of Alienage, at 47 (July 28, 1980) (prepared
for the Alien Rights Law Project) (copy on file at the North Carohnajournalof InternationalLaw and
Commercial Regulation).
42

See text accompanying note 30 supra.

43 But see text accompanying notes 41-42 infa.
44 Thompson Memorandum, supra note 41, at 54 n.l.
45 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
4

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976) (two year back pay limitation for Title VII actions);
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anguish are available. 48 Finally, a section 1981 plaintiff will enjoy a
longer statute of limitations than he would under the very strict terms of
Title VII.

49

Unless these statutory changes are enacted or court interpretations
of section 1981 more effectively accomplish the same result, the ability of
private employers to discriminate against lawfully admitted noncitizens
will continue to grow in the U.S. labor market. The effect is to create an
underclass of workers whose alienage is the reason for not being hired or
promoted to certain jobs. Such unrestricted discrimination against lawful resident aliens severely limits their access to significant occupational
opportunities and keeps them confined to jobs with limited career development where control by employers is almost totally unrestricted. This
denial of access to meaningful jobs is a pervasive aspect of the "scorched
earth" approach to immigration control.
IV.

State Public Employment and Licensing

Alienage is a suspect classification under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourteenth amendment. In the leading case of Sugarman
v. Dougall, 5 0 the Court held that state action that discriminates in public
employment against certain persons on the basis of their citizenship or
alienage is therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Other decisions of the
Supreme Court applied the same principle to state licensing practices.5 '
Consequently, states are constitutionally barred from restricting public
employment access of noncitizens as well as aliens to the "common occupations of the community," including the practice of professions. This
line of decisions is based not only on the Court's traditional approach to
fourteenth amendment equal protection guaranties, but also on Congress' plenary power over immigration policy. State restrictions on the
type of occupations available to noncitizens amount to placing conditions for admitting immigrants into the United States, conditions which
only Congress is constitutionally allowed to establish.
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (two year back pay limitation not
applicable to section 1981 actions).
47 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
48 McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), afd, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Gore v.
Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977), Plummer v. Chicago Journeyman Plumbers' Local 130,
452 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
49 Under Title VII, a plaintiff must file his claim with the EEOC within 180 days of the
alleged violation, or within 300 days if there has been deferral to a state or local agency. Following notice of his right to sue from the EEOC, the Title VII plaintiff must bring suit within
90 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(e)-(f. Under section 1981, which does not impose its own limitation period, the plaintiff must proceed under the limit imposed by the most appropriate state
statute, such as personal injury and contract claims statutes. Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975).
50 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
51 Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976); In re Grifliths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410
(1948).
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The most recent trend in Supreme Court cases, however, has been
one of opening up exceptions to the general rule. In Foley v. Connehe,52
the Supreme Court affirmed New York's policy of restricting access to
53
In Ambach v.Norwi', 54
employment as state troopers to U.S. citizens.
the Court upheld a New York rule that restricts the hiring of public
school teachers to U.S. citizens or permanent residents who declare their
intention to become citizens. 55 In both cases, the Court departed from
the strict scrutiny standard and applied a rational relationship test, finding in each instance that there was a rational relationship between the
interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification. In this
manner, the Court has retreated somewhat from its position regarding
congressional plenary power over immigration policy by allowing states
to set restrictions on the public employment of lawfully admitted permanent residents. The decisions also effectively open the door to future exceptions to "common occupations of the community" that have
heretofore been open to noncitizens. For instance, the rationale for Foley
is that state troopers perform functions that go to the "heart of representative government" 56 because they are cloaked with substantial discretionary power and execute broad public policy; the same rationale
conceivably might be extended to private security guards. In Ambach, a
similar decision was based on the fact that education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local government; 57 that rationale conceivably might be legislatively extended to private school teachers.
Thus, although Sugarman v.Dougall has not been overruled, important and open-ended exceptions have been carved out. In fact, challenges to the rulings in In re Griffiths and Flores de Otero relating to
professional licensing are finding their way to the Supreme Court on the
basis that lawyers, for example, perform an equally important governmental function by being officers of the court. 58 Foley and Ambach, therefore, are important in that they appear to open the door for additional
exceptions to the Yick W0 doctrine of prohibiting state public employment discrimination based on alienage. 59 The lower courts, both in state
60
and federal cases, seem to be applying the Foley exception narrowly.
52 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
53 Id at 300.
54 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
55
Id at 80-81.
56 435 U.S. at 297-300. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 647.
57 442 U.S. at 76.
58 State v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 601 P.2d 174 (Wyo. 1979).
59 Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
60 See, e.g., Ramirez v. Sloss, 615 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Tsuda Maru,
479 F. Supp. 519 (D. Alaska 1979); Andrade v. Nadel, 477 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); De
Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 476 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Cal. 1979);
C.D.R. Enterprises v. Board of Educ., 412 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), afdmm, sub. noma.

Lefkowitz v. C.D.R. Enterprises, 429 U.S. 1031 (1977); Miranda v. Nelson, 351 F. Supp. 735 (D.
Ariz. 1972), afdmem., 413 U.S. 902 (1973); In re Park, 484 P.2d 690 (Alaska 1971); Arizona
State Liquor Bd. v. Ali, 27 Ariz. App. 16, 550 P.2d 663 (1976); Raffaelli v. Committee of Bar
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The trend opened by Foley and Ambach, however, has already produced
the effect of virtually eliminating alienage from the list of suspect classifications which require strict judicial scrutiny under fourteenth amendment analysis.
This judicial development also operates to place more burdens and
restrictions on lawfully admitted noncitizens and closes doors to their
pursuit of constructive vocations in the United States. It not only qualifies the equality of treatment that should be central to immigration policy, but also creates unnecessary tensions in the labor market. Foley type
restrictions will push more aliens into private sector employment opportunities where they are most likely to compete with unskilled U.S. citizens. Such restrictions may also lower the efficiency of governmental
services by forcing governments to draw their expert personnel from a
reduced pool of labor supply. Most likely, they will operate to increase
discriminatory effects on those ethnic minorities most easily identified
with the concept of "alien" throughout the country.
Clearly, there are certain government positions that should be restricted to U.S. citizens. Elective and nonelective positions that are vital
to broad decisions and execution of public policy are among them. Representative government demands that truly important governmental
functions that affect the citizenry at large be restricted to those who are
an integral part of that citizenry. It is important, however, that restrictions of this nature be carefully and narrowly drawn, both to avoid infringing the equal protection clause and to provide stability to this area
of employment discrimination law.
The amendment to section 1981 proposed in section III of this article could accomplish this end. The proposed amendment of section 1981
would remove the post-Sugarman restrictions on alien employment while
allowing states to restrict to their citizens those functions that go to the
heart of representative government.
V.

6
Federal Public Employment of Aliens '

A.

Hzstoy and Current State of the Law

General federal policy has consistently prohibited the employment
of aliens in the federal service within the United States. The policy has
Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972) (en banc); Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969) (en banc); Ruiz-Cano v.
County of San Diego, 98 Cal. App. 3d 803, 159 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1979); Millett v. Hoisting
Engineers' Licensing Div., 377 A.2d 229 (R.I. 1977); Nielsen v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 90
Wash. 2d 818, 585 P.2d 1191 (1978) (en banc); Herriott v. City of Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 48, 500
P.2d 101 (1972) (en banc); State ex re. Mansfield v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 601 P.2d 174
(Wyo. 1979).
61 The original version of the federal employment of aliens portion of this article was
prepared by co-author Charles Smith in his role of full-time legal consultant to the Select
Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. Important guidance on that version was
provided by the Commission's Deputy Director Dr. Ralph Thomas.
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been initiated by an administrative agency, by presidential order, and by
the Congress. First, the Civil Service Commission was created in 188362
to oversee and advance the merit system, and its initial rules limited
competitive examination posts to citizens. 63 This policy withstood challenge until 1976, when the U.S. Supreme Court's decision of Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong 64 voided it for being beyond the Commission's authority.
It was reinstated through executive order;6 5 today, the Office of Personnel Management's Rule 7.4 carries out that policy. 6 6 With very narrow
exceptions, only U.S. citizens are eligible to be examined for and offered
competitive civil service posts. Since 1938, Congress, too, has imposed
restrictions on the use of federal funds to pay the salaries of aliens in the
United States. Initially a response to unemployment during the depression, the congressional ban on alien federal employment continues today,
though modified by refugee- and nationality-based exceptions and by
general alien employment authority given to certain departments and
agencies. 6 7 This section will describe the traditional policy and its current methods of implementation and will then analyze the usefulness of
continuing that policy in the future.
On September 2, 1976, President Gerald Ford issued an executive
order 68 to reinstate the traditional policy of excluding aliens from the
competitive federal service. This order was issued in response to the
Supreme Court's five to four decision three months earlier in Hampton v.
Mow Sun Wong. 69 Mow Sun Wong held that the Civil Service Commission's regulation limiting entry to examinations for the federal competitive service to citizens and U.S. nationals 70 was outside the scope of
Commission authority and violated the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. The Supreme Court in Mow Sun Wong did not consider the
general constitutionality of the bar to lawful permanent resident alien
employment in the competitive civil service. It decided only the issue of
whether the Commission properly could rely upon the argued justifications for its rule. The Court found the Commission's sole concern to be
"the promotion of an efficient federal service." '7 1 The administrative
convenience of a simple exclusion policy was not shown to be necessary
for efficiency so as to excuse the Commission from applying personnel
expertise to alien employment.
62 Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
63 See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 106-13 (1976). The author estimates
that approximately 60% of all federal employees are in the competitive service.
64 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
65 Exec. Order No. 11,935, 5 C.F.R. § 7.4 (1980).
66 Id
67 31 U.S.C. § 699b (Supp. III 1979).
68 Exec. Order No. 11,935, 5 C.F.R. § 7.4 (1980).
69 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
70 Nationals are either citizens or noncitizens who owe permanent allegiance to the United
States; the principal noncitizen nationals are American Samoans.
71 426 U.S. at 114.
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The Court held that "broadly denying this class [of lawfully admitted permanent resident aliens] substantial opportunities for employment
. . .deprives its members of an aspect of liberty."' 72 These aliens were

admitted to residency in the United States as a result of congressional
and presidential decisions. Therefore,
due process requires that the decision to impose that deprivation of an
important liberty be made either at a comparable level of government
or, if it is to be permitted to be made by the Civil Service Commission,
that it be
justified by reasons which are properly the concern of that
73
agency.

The Court explicitly assumed without deciding that the Congress or the
President constitutionally might have such discriminatory power. Given
this broad hint, presidential action quickly followed and thereby located
the question in the arena of policy determinations.
B.

Executive Order 11,935

President Ford's Executive Order 11,935, which became Office of
Personnel Management Rule 7.4,74 substantially accomplished what the
stricken Commission regulation had done. 75 The Order and the Rule
state:
a)

No person shall be admitted to competitive examination unless such
person is a citizen or national of the United States.
b) No person shall be given any appointment in the competitive service unless such person is a citizen or national of the United States.
c) The Commission may, as an exception to this rule and to the extent
permitted by law, authorize the appointment of aliens to positions
in the competitive service when necessary to promote the efficiency
76
of the service in specific cases or for temporary appointments.

The background and policy basis for the Executive Order were set
forth by President Ford in a letter to Congress dated September 2,
1976.77 The points of that letter..merit highlighting. First, the President
interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Mow Sun Wong to mean that
the Congress or the President might broadly prohibit the employment of
aliens in the civil service. The Executive Order was issued by presidential authority, but urged Congress to address the issue as well. Second,
the general ban on alien employment in the competitive service has a
long history; President Ford concluded that its preservation was in the
national interest at that time. Third, exceptions to the general ban are
limited to service efficiency and the national interest and could arise in
72 Id.at 116.
73 Id
74

5 C.F.R. § 7.4 (1980).

75 Challenges to the order have not been successful to date. Plaintiff's claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1981 was rejected in Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 905 (1979). Mow Sun Wong recently lost another appeal before the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980).
76 5 C.F.R. § 7.4 (1980).
77 41 Fed. Reg. 37,303 (1979).
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specific cases or from specific circumstances. Finally, he stated that
before aliens are ever "precipitously" employed in the competitive service, there must be "an appropriate determination that it is in the na' 78
tional interest to do so."
The President's letter thus implies that nonprecipitous opening of
competitive service employment opportunity to lawful permanent resident aliens might be appropriate and in the national interest. It indicates, too, that the question is subject to rational judgment and that both
the Congress and the President are appropriate policymaking institutions. The thrust of the letter is that the status quo should be maintained
pending careful review and policy decision.
More than four years and one administration have passed since
President Ford's letter. The need for immediate review and policy modification is supported by persuasive arguments that the Executive Order is
of dubious constitutional validity. 79 Presidential authority to issue such
a regulation can only be based on the President's power to appoint federal officers.80 In Mow Sun Wong, the government cited Myers v. Untied
States"' as authority, but that case dealt only with the power to remove
an officer without the advice and consent of the Senate and was later
limited to specific causes of removal.8 2 Further, statutory authority to
regulate admission of individuals to the civil service 8 3 does not vest the
President with any broad power to exclude large classes of individuals;
explicit congressional authorization is necessary where "substantial restraints on employment opportunities of numerous persons" 8 4 are imposed. Finally, the Executive Order may violate the "due process" clause
of the fifth amendment under the principle announced in Bolhg v.
Sharpe8 5 because the Order does not specify the national interest on
which it is based nor explain why it is beneficial for the "efficiency of the
service." Courts would be bound to examine carefully those claimed interests before justifying the discriminatory treatment prescribed by the
86
Order.
C

The Legislative Branch Prohibition

Congress has not legislated in response to President Ford's letter.
Congress has, however, voted restrictions on the federal employment of
78 Id at 37,304.
79 J. Kramer, Federal Employment of Aliens (Aug. 1, 1980) (paper prepared at Covington
and Burling for the Alien Rights Law Project) (copy on file at the North CarolinaJournaloflnternational Law and CommercialRegulation).

80 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
81
82
83
84

272 U.S. 52 (1926).
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
5 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976).
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 506 (1959).

85 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
86 Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572,
605 (1976).
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aliens for more than four decades. Section 602 of the Treasury, Postal
Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 198087 carries
forward congressional restrictions that have been included routinely in
appropriations bills since 1938.88 Under section 602 of the 1980 Act, 31
U.S.C. § 699b, no federal monies may be used to compensate any federal
officer or employee whose post of duty is in the continental United States
unless such person: (1) is a U.S. citizen; (2) on the date of enactment of
the Act, September 29, 1979, was in the U.S. service, was eligible for
citizenship, had filed a declaration of intent to become a citizen, and was
residing in the United States; (3) owes allegiance to the United States
(covers nationals from American Samoa and Swains Islands); (4) is a
lawful permanent resident from Cuba, Poland, South Vietnam, or the
Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); (5) is South Vietnamese,
Cambodian, or Laotian and was paroled into the United States as a refugee between January 1, 1975 and September 29, 1979; (6) is a citizen of
Israel or the Republic of the Philippines or a national of."those countries
allied with the United States in the current defense effort," defined as
having mutual defense treaties with the United States-Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Republic of China (Taiwan), Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Thailand, Trinidad and
Tobago, Turkey, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Venezuela; 89 or (7) is
being employed temporarily as a translator or for no more than sixty
days "in the field service . . .as a result of emergencies. '"9°
Congress has exempted certain governmental units from the general
ban on employing aliens. These include: National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, 9' Department of Defense, 92 International Communications Agency (relating to skill in foreign language), 93 Foreign Agricultural Service until 1974, 94 Foreign Service Institute of the
Department of State, 95 Public Health Service (consultants and fellowship recipients), 96 Library of Congress (up to 15 positions), 9 7 Smithso87 31 U.S.C. § 699b (Supp. 111 1979).
88 For a list of the appropriations bills, see the annotations after 31 U.S.C. § 699b (1976 &

Supp. III 1979). Seealso Act of March 28, 1938, ch. 55, § 5, 52 Stat. 148.
89 Telephone conversation between Charles Smith and Consular Affairs counsel, Office of
the Legal Advisor, Dep't of State, May 1980. Taiwan's retention on the list by the Department
of State is uncertain following the Carter Administration's changes in diplomatic and treaty
relationships.
9 31 U.S.C. § 699b (Supp. III 1979).
91 42 U.S.C. § 2473(b)(10) (1976).
92 31 U.S.C. § 700 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
93 22 U.S.C. § 1474(1) (Supp. III 1979).
94 7 U.S.C. § 435 (expired 1974).
95 22 U.S.C. § 1044(e) (1976).

96 42 U.S.C. § 209(h) (1976).
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nian Institution (scientific and technical positions), 98 and the Postal
Service. 99
D.

Impact of Prohibit'tions

The most current data on the number and status of aliens lawfully
in the United States are compiled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service through its annual alien address report program. For fiscal
year 1979, INS data show 5,058,400 aliens reporting, 0 0° slightly more
than two percent of the U.S. population, of whom approximately
4,700,000 are lawful permanent residents and refugees. 10 Of this total
lawful permanent resident and refugee population, approximately
3,500,000 come under the section 699b refugee- and nationality-based
exceptions to the general ban. Thus, congressional policy under section
699b permits federal employment of at least seventy-four percent of the
10 2
alien population authorized to work in the country.
The federal competitive service contains approximately 1.8 million
jobs. Federal civilian jobs excepted from competitive examination, such
as Schedules A and C and the Postal Service, comprise about one million
positions.10 3 For aliens to be hired for excepted positions not covered by
97 2 U.S.C. § 169 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
98 20 U.S.C. § 46a (1976).
99 See United States Postal Service, Personnel Series Handbook P-11, § 312.2 (May 1980).
The Postal Service has adopted a policy of full access by all permanent residents and refugees to
all its positions at level PS-19 or below except for those designated "sensitive." Id.
100 Because some aliens lawfully here do not report, the data represent an undercount of
unknown magnitude.
101 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT

(1979). Although 31 U.S.C. § 699b (Supp. III 1979) in its general rule and exemptions speaks in
terms of lawful permanent residents, refugees, and nationals of certain countries and makes no
distinctions based on immigration status, the numbers drawn from INS data exclude foreign
nationals who do not have permanent residence or refugee status but who nevertheless may
have permission to work in the United States without violating the terms of their admission.
This would include, for example, foreign students who are in the country on nonimmigrant
visas. As nationals of countries designated in section 699b, such students would be technically
eligible for federal service employment. Because their stay is limited to the term of their studies,
they are unlikely candidates for federal employment; therefore, their numbers have not been
included in the INS data.
102 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT

(1979). These aliens include immigrants from the following countries who have not become
citizens: Mexico (1,003,470 lawful permanent residents reporting in 1979), Canada (269,643),
The Philippines (217,575), Italy (176,531), South Korea (154,914), and Vietnam (89,039 plus
41,443 refugees). Id.
There is no reason to believe that the percentage of whatever the actual count of refugees
and lawful permanent residents in the United States is would be out of line with the 74% figure.
Neither the number nor the percentage are adjusted by an age profile excluding alien children
or retirees who are not part of the working population. INS-reported data do not permit an
age-nationality breakdown. There is no reason to believe that an age-nationality profile would
change significantly the percentage of aliens permitted to be employed by the federal government, however. It is likely, though, that the proportion of working age people, from the noncitizen immigrant population is somewhat higher than the working age figures for the U.S.
population as a whole because immigrants tend to be young adults.
103 Office of Personnel Management, Central Personnel Data File: Overview Report (Feb.

1980).
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Executive Order 11,935 or, under the Order, for tasks for which Ameri0 4
can citizens cannot be found (usually requiring highly technical skills),'
section 699b requirements must be met or the jobs must be in agencies or
departments having general authority to hire aliens.
As of February 1980, out of a domestic civilian federal workforce of
2,765,488, there were 5,497 alien employees, which includes temporary
and short term as well as permanent employees. 105 The Veterans Administration employs 238,491 persons, of whom 2,891 are aliens.1 0 6 Within
the Army civilian workforce of 335,426, only 278 are aliens.' 0 7 Thus,
although Congress seems to have created massive exceptions to the general ban principle, the reality is less far-reaching than the law would indicate. The proportion of aliens employed by the federal government is
only 0.2 percent of the total domestic civilian federal workforce, while
aliens eligible to work make up about 1.5 percent of the total U.S. population. 08
1
The number of alien applicants and rejections for the approximately one million noncompetitive federal service positions are unknown. Without that data, inferences of bias on the part of the
government cannot be drawn even though the number of aliens hired by
the federal government is small. Questions about possible bias, however,
certainly are appropriate. Thus, it is appropriate to ask whether alien
applications are relatively low as compared to citizen applications and, if
so, whether that is due to a general belief on the part of both aliens and
federal officials that alien federal employment is barred. Similarly, one
can ask whether executive officials are adhering to a general pattern of
discouraging and rejecting the employment of aliens.
E

A Poicy Question

The current general executive policy of no federal employment of
aliens derives from the principle that employment in the federal sector is
a benefit or right accruing only from citizenship. The exceptions to the
Executive Order are tied tightly to specific personnel needs that cannot
be met by citizens or other U.S. nationals. Specific legislative exemptions for departments and agencies under section 699b, on the other
hand, reveal that Congress is carving out exceptions almost to the point
of turning the general ban principle on its head. Unlike department and
agency exemptions that arguably arise from particular agency or expertise needs, these section 699b exceptions simply combine nationality and
immigration status or arise from nationality as identified by a mutual
104 In practice, when executive departments or agencies hire aliens in accordance with the
Executive Order exceptions, appointments are made on an excepted service basis, even though
the specific position previously was listed in the competitive service.
105
106
107
108

See note 103 supra.
Id.
Id.
Figures derived from text accompanying notes 100-102 supra.
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defense treaty. Citizens from fifty-one nations, slightly less than onethird of the 163 nations of the world, are covered to varying extents by
section 699b.
In terms of the present U.S. immigration profile, the Congress in
section 699b denies only one out of every four lawful permanent residents
and refugees possible federal employment. Thus, through exceptions
Congress has effectively reversed the general rule of discrimination.
Although political and legal challenges to the federal hiring policy
toward aliens may continue, legal authority today permits federal discrimination against aliens in the federal service as long as that policy is
set at the proper level of government, by the Congress or the President.
This permissible discrimination appears to be sanctioned in Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Mow Sun Wong,' 0 9 as well as in the majority opinion, as Justice Rehnquist argued only that the Commission rule was a
proper exercise of delegated authority. Though the issue was not litigated, the Justices in both the majority and the dissent did not oppose
the view that the question is one of policy and not of law, the law directing only the procedures to be used to reach an exclusionary or inclusionary end. The consequence is that today there is no legal compulsion
for the President or Congress to adopt one principle over the other.
As a result of the present state of the law, challenges to the Executive Order have taken the form of petitions directed to the President to
change or eliminate the rule by another executive decision. Such requests have been made by public interest and community based organizations whose constituencies include large numbers of permanent
residents. 110
F

The Arguments for a General Ban and Our Opinions

The present policy and practice is not soundly based in the national
interest and in fact has a negative impact on civil rights, government
services, and the overall labor market. A policy of full access by permanent residents and refugees, with carefully drawn exceptions for positions
with policy-making functions or whose power affects the citizenry
broadly, would be much sounder.
L

Domestic and InternationalTradition

The present policy is based on a long-standing domestic tradition
dating back nearly one hundred years. Moreover, it is in keeping with
what seems to be the practice of most other nations. A United Nations
survey of domestic law published in 1966 showed that only Ethiopia did
109 426 U.S. at 124-25 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110 Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund and Covington & Burling,
Memorandum on Section 602 of Public Law 95-8 1, at 22 (1978) (copy on file at the North Carotina Journalof InternationalLaw and CommercialRegulation).
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not restrict public service posts to nationals.' II This generalized practice
seems to be founded on the view that national governance is a duty and a
privilege flowing from the concepts of nationality and national sovereignty.
The U.S. tradition, however, has become as much one of growing
exceptions to a general ban as one of a general pattern of not hiring
aliens. Despite international tradition, the United States is above all a
unique country. More than any other country in the world, the United
States is a "nation of immigrants." Recognizing this fact, the Supreme
Court urged in Mow Sun Wong that the nation should not root its attitudes toward immigrants in the nineteenth century:
Moreover, it must be acknowledged that in 1883 there was no doubt a

greater inclination than we can now accept to regard "foreigners" as a
somewhat less desirable class of persons than American citizens. A provincial attitude toward aliens. . . has been implicitly repudiated by our
cases requiring that aliens
be treated with the dignity and respect ac1 12
corded to other persons.
Furthermore, the United States might be better served by establishing its
principles toward immigrant non-nationals without regard to the practices of other nations. As in the encompassing area of human rights, the
United States should set standards for other nations to emulate.
2. National Securty and Allegiance
A second argument for retaining a general ban is the presumption
that persons who have a national loyalty elsewhere cannot maintain a
loyalty to the United States. Admittedly, it is difficult to make a qualitative presumption about a subjective attribute for which nationality is but
one factor. The above presumption is nevertheless subject to criticism.
Lawful permanent residents have only one domicile, the United
States. They serve in the Armed Forces and are subject to conscription;1 '3 they pay taxes; and, as the Supreme Court reiterated in Mow Sun
Wong, "it is settled that aliens may take an appropriate oath of allegiance.""14 Furthermore, the Postal Service has been able to identify by
level and sensitivity those positions that require special inquiry for a lawful permanent resident to be hired. Aliens are also employed in sensitive
agencies such as NASA and ICA. Practice, then, shows that alienage is
not a firm barrier to security clearance, loyalty, or allegiance.
3.

An Incentive to Naturalize

A third argument made is that citizenship is the ultimate goal in the
admission of permanent residents and there must be incentives to induce
" I United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Handbook of Civil Service
Laws and Practices, at 329, U.N. Doc. ST/TAO/M 29 (1966).
112 426 U.S. at 107.
113 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 453, 454(a) (1976).
114 426 U.S. at 109.
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permanent residents to adopt U.S. citizenship. Access to federal employment is thus presented as a feature that makes naturalization an attractive proposition for lawful permanent residents. While immigration itself
may properly have economic motives, the United States may want citizenship to be sought and cherished for its intrinsic value. If this is the
U.S. goal, it can best be accomplished by ensuring that an immigrant's
citizenship interests are unselfish. It is possible, too, that an alien employed by the federal government would be more likely to naturalize as a
gesture of loyalty. The complexity and delicacy of the highly personal
decision to naturalize should not be disturbed. Holding out federal employment as an incentive to naturalize may skew a decision that ought to
be reached on grounds pertaining to U.S. values and history without regard to job prospects.
4.

Employment Competition

A fourth argument for the present system is that it preserves a
number of jobs for American citizens in an era of persistent unemployment. The problems of the depression, which led Congress to enact section 699b, remain present today albeit in a less critical form. A
supporting argument is that recent additions to the labor force in the
form of immigrants should more appropriately go to the private sector
because it is there and not in the government where growth takes place
and to which recent additions should contribute.
It may be erroneous, however, to view the labor market as having
two distinct parts, government and nongovernment. One can posit that
economic analysis would show that excluding lawful permanent residents
and refugees from federal employment has an exaggerated impact on job
opportunities and wage levels in selected sectors of the labor market, especially entry levels that promise upward mobility in service and manufacturing industries. If this theory be true, it could harm citizens in
locales where noncitizen immigrants cluster, such as urban centers that
contain large populations of minority youth and other disadvantaged
workers seeking private employment. Federal employment also may be
concentrated in urban centers; opening federal employment opportunities to aliens may reduce competition for private employment. Finally, a
federal exclusionary policy toward aliens may contribute both to citizen
insensitivity to immigrants and to increased conflict, fostered by the appearance of federal approval of second-class status for immigrants and by
private sector competition. The federal government's obligation to citizens is paramount, but it is open to question whether giving preference to
citizens over aliens in federal employment meets that obligation.
5. Federal-State Consistency
It is equally open to question whether the federal policy of exclusion
is valid when a similar state policy would be clearly unconstitutional. As

N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

40

discussed in section IV of this article, the current state of the law on
access by immigrants to state public employment is quite different from
that at the federal level. States may not discriminate between aliens and
citizens in their employment and licensing laws unless they show a "compelling government interest" in drawing distinctions against aliens, who
are within a "suspect classification."'' 5 In 1978 and 1979, the Supreme
Court found citizenship to be a proper qualification for state troopers 116
and for teachers." 17 In both cases, the Supreme Court found a sufficient
state interest because the jobs involved governmental functions calling
for the "formulation, execution or review of broad public policy"" 8 and
going to "the heart of representative government." ' " 9
State cases in this area are based on the fourteenth amendment, and
because of Congress' plenary power over immigration and the President's
discretionary authority in implementing congressional decisions, it is
clear that similar arguments do not apply to the federal government
from a constitutional point of view. It is anomalous, however, for the
federal judiciary to place more stringent standards upon the states in the
area of public employment than it does upon the federal government
itself. The legal conclusion that, because of plenary powers, the federal
government may discriminate more broadly against aliens than may
state governments, does not direct a policy conclusion that such discrimination is proper. If it is appropriate for states to meet equal protection
standards in applying citizenship requirements to their employees, it
should be no less so for the federal government.
Three principles appear to be set forth by the Supreme Court in its
state employment discrimination cases: (1) "common occupations of the
community" cannot be denied to residents, regardless of citizenship; (2)
sweeping limitations by states on alien employment are impermissible;
and (3) states may identify citizenship as relevant to particular jobs that
pertain to governmental functions affecting the broad conduct of the citizenry, such as law enforcement and education. The federal government
should set the same standards for itself.
6

Treaty Negotiation

The government's brief in Mow Sun Wong stated that one more reason to continue the policy of a general ban is that holding out special
benefits to foreign nationals may be useful in negotiating international
treaties. 2 0° From the list of section 699b exceptions, though, it is not
115 SeeIn re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973);

Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
116 Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
117 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
118 441 U.S. at 74; 435 U.S. at 296 (both cases quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,

647 (1973)).
"19

441 U.S. at 74 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).

120 Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 61, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
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evident that federal employment has been a useful bargaining chip. In
France, for instance, U.S. citizens are not given reciprocal access to foreign positions. Section 699b exceptions also reveal federal employment
eligibility for persons from the communist countries of Cuba and Poland
and refugees from Southeast Asia. On the other hand, persons from
some friendly countries without mutual defense treaties with the United
States, including Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland, and Egypt, 12' do not
have such preference. Further, nationality does not play a direct role in
the Executive Order exceptions, nor is it pertinent to the departments
and agencies that Congress permits to hire aliens. The American Civil
Liberties Union, in its brief on behalf of Mow Sun Wong, stated the essence of the difficulty with the bargaining chip argument: "The notion
that resident aliens may be used as 'bargaining chips' to obtain benefits
for American citizens residing abroad truly 'shocks the conscience' and
22
violates the first principles of due process of law.'
G

FurtherArguments Aganst a General Ban

Finally, two other reasons militate against the maintenance of the
status quo. First, the narrow and limited exceptions to the general ban
have resulted in a cumbersome procedure to establish when conditions
have been met for hiring noncitizens. Determinations that citizens are
not available to fill certain positions involve costly administrative proceedings and in many cases simply are not made. The result is harmful
to the efficiency of agencies in certain areas, particularly where needs
and shortages of personnel are difficult to predict and congressional or
presidential policies lack flexibility.
Second, in areas where permanent residents tend to be of one single
national origin, such as the Mexicans in the Southwest, the present policy only aggravates an existing pattern of employment discrimination
based on race and national origin.
H

Conclusion

The only sure function of the current policy and practice is the discouragement of immigration by closing employment opportunities to
permanent residents and refugees. The practice is thus another instance
of using the labor market as a means to implement a nonexplicit immigration policy. It also represents an unfortunate aspect of a diffuse policy
toward immigrants which maintains them in an inferior or second-class
status. This policy is especially unacceptable when no valid national interest is served and when, in fact, there are clear indications that it creates negative side effects in the field of civil rights and economic
opportunity for all members of the community.
121 See note 89 supra.
122 Amicus Curiae Brief at 18 n.3, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (Amer-

ican Civil Liberties Union).
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A more sensible and simple approach would be a policy of full access to federal positions for immigrants, refugees, and other aliens duly
authorized to work, with exceptions carved out for functions where citizenship is undoubtedly relevant-such as representing the United States
before foreign governments--or whose power affects the citizenry directly and broadly, such as a judge or any high federal policy-maker.
Congress, therefore, should enact comprehensive legislation in this
area, an action that is clearly within its powers. Such legislation should
secure the general principle of access, with exceptions for fundamental
government functions and national security-sensitive positions. The
agencies then should be directed to issue guidelines to determine when
such exceptions apply 12 3 and to establish recruitment and hiring standards reflecting the general access principle.
The general principle of access fits within U.S. traditions of openness and freedom, enhances competition and thus efficiency, and is one
hallmark of an open as opposed to a closed society. It, of course, admits
exceptions where necessary and justifiable. The opposite principle, closing job opportunities, is the present policy and is part of an emerging
"scorched earth" attitude toward aliens, including lawful immigrants.
When the federal government sets such standards and legitimizes such
attitudes by doing so, it acts as a beacon for similar actions by other
levels of government and by private enterprise. "Scorched earth," in this
way, becomes not the exception but the rule.
VI.

Employer Sanctions

Employer sanctions are laws that penalize the hiring of a person not
legally permitted to work. For example, when the Fair Labor Standards
Act prohibits oppressive child labor,124 it imposes employer sanctions
through the rationale that government should protect those who need
protection and cannot protect themselves. 125 Except for the Farm Labor
Contractor Registration Act of 1963,126 federal law today does not regulate private employer hiring of persons by immigration or citizenship status. 12 7 Federal law, generally, does not require a private employer to
123 Kramer, supra note 79, at 36.
124 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1976).
Penalties include criminal prosecution, id § 216(a), and injunctive relief, id. § 217, for both employment and the transportation and sale of goods in which
oppressive child labor is used.
125 Other rationales for government interference in the market economy include ensuring
decent wages and working conditions, protecting group action, preventing monopolistic practices, promoting equal access, and remedying past injury. The gamut of traditional policy reasons should be kept in mind when thinking about employer sanctions.
126 7 U.S.C. § 2045(f) (1976) (indirect regulation of alien by regulation of migrant worker
employer who violates the Act if he employs an illegal alien and is subject to civil and criminal
sanctions for such violation).
127 Twelve states have employer sanction laws. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2805 (West Supp. 1980);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51k (West Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (1979);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.09 (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4409 (1974); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, § 871 (West Supp. 1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 19C (Michie Supp. 1981);
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determine affirmatively that a job applicant or employee is a citizen or a
individual INS permisnoncitizen legally in the United States, holding
128
sion or a visa authorizing such employment.
Through the "harboring" exception to section 274 called the "Texas
proviso," the INA makes this explicit:
Any person ...

who ...

(3) wilfully or knowingly conceals, harbors, or

shields from detection, or attempts to conceal, harbor or shield from detection, in any place, including any building or any means of transportation . . . any alien, including an alien crewman, not duly admitted by

an immigration officer or not lawfully entitled to enter or reside within
the United States under the terms of this chapter or of any other law
relating to the immigration or exptilsion of aliens, shall be guilty of a
felony, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $2,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years,
or both, for each alien in respect to whom any violation of this subsection occurs: Provided, however, that for the purposes of this section, emincident to
ployment (including the usual and normal practices 129
employment) shall not be deemed to constitute harboring.

The felony of harboring an illegal alien, with its "Texas proviso," illuminates but does not dispose of the employer sanctions issue in the immigratior debate.
If the "Texas proviso" were repealed and "harboring" be deemed to
include employment, the law would contain a stringent and comprehensive employer sanction, the possibility of felony penalties against employers who hire aliens whose presence in the United States is illegal. The
present asymmetry of deporting the undocumented alien worker without
penalizing the employer would be removed. To some, the harshness of
alien deportation would thereby find its equal in felony consequences to
the employer.
Employer sanctions accomplished by removing the employers' harboring exception in the INA, however, are not only unlikely as a political
matter, but also prosecutorially unpromising. The offense does not warrant such severe punishment and the high scienter standard, "wilfully or
knowingly," makes conviction unlikely, if only because of the technical
MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 39, § 2-305 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 275-A, § 4-a (Supp. 1979);
N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:9-1 (West 1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 444a (1978); VA. CODE § 40.1il.1 (Supp. 1980).
Though state authority to enact such laws has been upheld as legitimate state labor market
protective action not preempted by federal plenary power over immigration, De Canas v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351 (1976), enforcement is dormant. This is partly because the offense is viewed as
insignificant in the range of prosecutorial priorities and partly because proof of intent, ("knowing" employment of an undocumented alien is the usual standard which can be met by a showing of "pattern and practice"), is very difficult as few employers are expert pathfinders in the
labyrinth of the INA.
128 An employer who refuses to hire a noncitizen, regardless of the alien's immigration
status, does not risk liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 so long as his
discrimination ground is alienage and not "national origin." Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414
U.S. 86, 95 (1973).
129 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3) (1976).
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nature of an alien's due admission into or lawful entitlement to "enter or
reside" in the United States. The practical barriers to enforcing not only
the harboring provisions of section 274 but also the concealing and
shielding provisions, for which direct eyewitness evidence seems necessary, give the "Texas proviso" the appearance of surplus legislative language. Yet, though removal of the proviso likely would not change the
effect of the present law, it is the implication of the "Texas proviso" that
is particularly troubling; employers may use cheap, exploitable labor
without serious risk.
There are energetic advocates of employer sanctions as the ultimate
solution to the illegal alien problem, 30 viewing it less as a method to
prevent alien abuse than as a way to control illegal immigration and to
protect against impacts on the labor market. During the past decade,
employer sanctions legislation has been actively pursued by Congress
with support from the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. The
major proposals are synopsized in Table 1.
The argument put forth by employer sanction advocates is rarely
cluttered by complex questions of assumptions, means, or ends. For instance, in 1975, the House Judiciary Committee reported:
The committee believes that the primary reason for the illegal alien
problem is the economic imbalance between the United States and the
countries from which the aliens come, coupled with the chance of employment in the United States. Consequently, it is apparent that this
problem cannot be solved as long as jobs can be obtained by those who
enter legally as non-immigrants for the sole purpose of obtaining employment.
The Committee, therefore, is of the opinion that the most reasonable
approach to this problem is to make unlawful the "knowing" employment of illegal aliens, thereby removing the economic incentive which
draws aliens to the United States as well as the incentive for employers
to exploit this source of labor. 131
The simplicity of the statement in part accounts for its attractiveness. Despite the impressionistic nature and the attendant dangers of

misusing the data on undocumented alien presence in the United States,
studies "generally agree that there is a significant undocumented worker

population in the United States . . . . The unresolved question is what
degree of economic impact undocumented workers have on American
130

Among these advocates are the Federation for American Immigration Reform which

successfully lobbied Senator Walter Huddleston to introduce an employer sanctions amendment to the 1980 INS "efficiency package." The package and the amendment never reached a

floor vote. David North, a researcher-activist from the New TransCentury Foundation in
Washington, D.C., has been a principal advisor on employer sanctions to the Select Commission
on Immigration and Refugee Policy. The Washington Post columnist William Raspberry has
written favorably about employer sanctions from a position of special concern over minority
unemployment. Raspberry, Another Side to "Hiring Amerzcan," Wash. Post, Sept. 15, 1980, § A, at
21, col. 2; Hinng American, Wash. Post, Sept. 8, 1980, § A, at 21, col. 6; Should It Be Legal to Hre
Illegals?, Wash. Post, Aug. 8, 1980, § A, at 13, col. I.
131 H.R. REP. No. 506, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1975).
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Table 1
Employment Eligibility and Employer Responsibility Bills
H.R. 16188
Rodino
Bill
(1972)

H.R. 8713
Rodino
Bill
(1975)

x

x

Explicit language prohibiting "knowing" employment of unauthorized
aliens
Employer defense based
on a bona fide inquiry re
employment eligibility

x

Sanctions for hiring limited to civil penalties

S.561
Kennedy
Bill
(1975)

S. 3074
Eastland
Bill
(1976)

S.2252
Carter
Package
(1977)

x

x

x

x

x

x

Sanctions for hiring including criminal penalties
Initial civil penalty followed by combination
with injunctive remedy
for "pattern or practice"
of employing illegal aliens
Attorney General authority to seek injunctive remedy

x

x

x

Felony to assist "knowingly and for gain" an undocumented alien in obtaining employment
Adjustment to permanent
resident status for some
illegal aliens

x

x

x

x

Adjustment to new temporary residence status for
some undocumented
aliens

x

Provision to assure labor
supply to employers
Attorney General authority to initiate actions for
national origin discrimination
Extension of Civil Rights
Act employment discrimination protection to aliens
authorized to work
Explicit preemption
clause

x

x

x

x

x

Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Working Paper, Inhibiting Illegal
Migration: Employment Eligibility and Employer Responsibility app. 16 (March 27, 1980).

workers." 132 On the one side are employer sanction proponents, among
132 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS

ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 57 (1980).

46

N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

whom an influential voice is David S. North, an economist specializing in
migration issues at the Trascentury Corporation, Washington, D.C. In
testimony on February 25, 1980 in Denver, before the Select Commission
on Immigration and Refugee Policy, he asked:
Why an employer sanctions program? It is clear that ... most illegal
migrants come to the U.S. to work, and one may assume, quite safely,
that there are millions of them in the U.S. labor market. An employer
sanctions program would discourage such employment, open up a
number of jobs (not one-for-one, of course) for U.S. residents, and serve
as a healthy tonic to the U.S. labor market ....
Elsewhere, North has written:
A number of benefits, both direct ones and indirect ones, would flow out
of an effective employer sanctions program.
The most obvious direct benefit would be the opening of a number of
jobs now held by undocumented workers ineligible for amnesty (or likely
to be filled by such workers in the future), most of which would be filled
by legal U.S. workers, thus decreasing U.S. unemployment.
The movement of, say, one million undocumented workers out of such
jobs would have a healthy effect on the secondary labor market, lifting
wages and perhaps improving working conditions for the largely disadvantaged resident workers holding secondary labor market jobs (Blacks,
Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, women, teenagers, the aging, and the handicapped). The lowered unemployment rate, in turn, would ease the pressure on the hard-pressed unemployment compensation trust funds, as
well as reducing the numbers of persons on food stamps, and perhaps
removing some
from the AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Chil33
dren] rolls. '
On the other side are employer sanctions skeptics and opponents

who challenge the assumptions. Attorneys at Georgetown University
Law Center's Institute for Public Representation write:
To conclude that employer sanctions would significantly ameliorate
these problems [e.g., displacement or disadvantaging of American workers, especially in light of high national unemployment rates; employer
exploitation of undocumented alien workers for economic advantage; a
marginal job sector outside the attractive mainstream economy; and
overuse of entitlement assistance programs] requires that one make two
essential assumptions. The first is that the marginal (sometimes called
"secondary") economy is what it is because it employs vulnerable undocumented workers. The other is that the inhibition of the "pull" factor of job opportunity will have a significant effect upon migration
patterns which by common agreement are the result of complex "pushpull" phenomenon, including conditions in the source countries, physical proximity, ease of access (particularly through the services of aliensmugglers or "coyotes") and cultural and family ties.
We do not argue that these assumptions are categorically wrong. We do
believe, however, that there is sufficient doubt about their validity to
suggest caution in proposing ways to deal with the problem of unauthorized immigration .

...

133 D. North, Keeping Undocumented Workers Out of the Workforce: Evaluation of Alternative Strategies, at 3-4 (May 1978) (Center for Labor and Migration Studies, New TransCentury Foundation, Washington, D.C.).
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We note also that job opportunity is but one of the many factors which
contribute to the flow of migrants, authorized or not, to the U.S.A. If
employer sanctions are effective in inhibiting particular job opportunities, they may nevertheless only marginally inhibit the migrant flow itself. This outcome would threaten to create a large undocumented
population, lacking economic self-sufficiency, which would either impose
other social costs, on public order or medical services for instance, or
34
would increase the labor force available to an underground economy. 1

This focus on assumptions is especially important, for the assumptions define the problems which employer sanctions are the proposed
means to eliminate. The principal problem that undocumented alien
workers are said to cause is American unemployment. Because this
premise has not been proven, there is more than an incidental element of
scapegoating when such authorities as former Secretary of Labor Ray
Marshall claim that excising undocumented workers from the labor force
would bring unemployment below the four percent level. 135 Others have
asserted the contrary, that the United States "should not attribute to
international migration an exaggerated effect on U.S. employment. The
unemployment rates in the United States are not primarily the result of
illegal migration."' 36 There is therefore much controversy over whether
any of the benefits of employer sanctions that are assumed by its advocates would really occur.
A superficial advantage of employer sanctions to those whose principal concern is the domestic scene is that it assumes complex motivational
"push" factors to be essentially irrelevant. The mere assertion that there
is employment opportunity in the United States says nothing about why
a Mexican may be more likely than a Canadian to migrate illegally. Nor
does it address myriad other aspects, ranging from the political and religious freedoms Americans enjoy, to the backlog effect of annual national
quotas and the racial bias in the INA due to historic exclusions and colonial limitations which today leave areas of the world with little or no
134 E. Glitzenstein, A. Pandya, and D. Parker, Discriminatory Effects of Employer Sanctions Programs Under Consideration By the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy, at 56-57 (November 1980) (prepared for the Alien Rights Law Project) (copy on file at
the Institute for Public Representation, Georgetown University Law Center).
135 See R. Waldinger, The Case Against Employer's Sanctions (May 1980) (Joint Center for
Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard University) (copy on file at the North CarolinaJournal of
InternationalLaw and Commercial Regulation). For Secretary Marshall's statement, see N.Y. Times,
Dec. 3, 1979, § A, at 22, col. 2. For elaboration of his views, see Marshall, Economic Faetors
Inenting the InternationalMigration of Workers, in ViEws ACROSS THE BORDER: THE UNITED
STATES AND MEXICO (S. Ross ed. 1980).
136 C. Keely, U.S. Immigration: A Policy Analysis, at 59 (1979) (a Public Issues paper of
The Population Council, New York). This viewpoint, however, internationalizes and raises
what may be a more fundamental if less politically resonant concern, population growth and
stabilization. See, e.g., L. Bouvier, The Impact of Immigration on U.S. Population Size, at 1-3
(January 1981) (Population Reference Bureau, Inc., Washington, D.C.). As a method of stabilizing population growth, too, employer sanctions have attracted some commentators. See generally Teitelbaum, Right Versus Right. Immigration and Refugee Polic in the United States, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, Fall 1980, at 21.
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access to family reunification. 3 7 Any palliative that responds to a partial diagnosis of a complex situation will inevitably be no more than symbolic and thus basically inadequate.
Furthermore, inherent in the assumptions about cause and effect are
untested assumptions about deterrence. Employer sanctions is a significant proposal that has been in the public eye for at least a decade, yet the
literature on it remains relatively small and unsophisticated in light of
the extensively applied experiences of social scientists, psychologists, and
planners working in law enforcement. 138 A review of all the employer
sanctions literature reveals no significant use of the extensive theoretical
and case study work on deterrence done by criminal justice researchers. 139 At the very least, proponents of employer sanctions should feel a
scholarly obligation to examine the utility of deterrence knowledge as
developed in the criminal justice area in relation to their deterrence
claims for employer sanctions as they affect both undocumented immigrants and U.S. employers. The fact that employer sanctions advocates
have not faced this responsibility leads one to ask whether the omissions
40
are purposeful or negligent; neither justification is acceptable.1
Hand in hand with a deterrence theory is a second question law
enforcement planners must ask: what incidence of illegality is acceptable? This question is posed to determine resource needs and allocations.
It presumes that "[s]ome law is always or almost always enforced, some is
never or almost never enforced, and some is sometimes enforced and
sometimes not."' 14 1 Yet this question, too, is barely touched upon by employer sanctions advocates. David North, for example, refers only to
comparative "degrees of effectiveness"' 142 of four types of employer sanc137 See generaly Waller, Unequal Protection." Ablt

Benefit, Pabh& Poiy, and Aliens, this issue.

138 Insights from anthropology and mental health, too, are poignantly neglected by employer sanctions advocates, perhaps because they ineluctably would be forced to deal with
"pull" factors other than paychecks and the host of "push" factors that they simply ignore.
139 The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration has supported a wide range of scholarship and experimental programs since its founding in 1968. Its National Institute of Justice
publishes an annual bibliography. The subject index of a recent bibliography identifies 27 of
the 656 entries as specifically about deterrence. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, SNI DOCUMENTS 1979:

LIOGRAPHY

A COMPREHENSIVE BIB-

(June 1980).

140 Although we are critical about leaps to policy recommendations-in particular those
supporting employer sanctions-that we believe will make major changes in the relationships
among people in the United States, we join David North in warning of the pitfalls in this
relatively uncharted area. He writes:
The reader should be warned that despite widespread interest in illegal migration
and bursts of ethnographic studies regarding the migrants themselves (an undeniably appealing group of subjects), there has been virtually no work done by scholars on alternative approaches to the enforcement of the immigration and related
laws. This report, then, is an exploration of a new field, written under deadline
pressures, and subject to the inherent disadvantages of those conditions.
D. North and J. Wagner, Enforcing The Immigration Law: A Review of the Options, at ix
(Draft, June 1980) (Center for Labor and Migration Studies, New TransCentury Foundation
Washington, D.C.) (prepared for the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy).
141 K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 1 (1975).
142 D. North, supra note 133, at 3. See Table 2 infia.
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tions legislation. If there are between 3.5 and 5 million unlawful residents in the United States, 143 it is necessary to ask what number or, since
the numbers are so speculative, what fractional reductions in the presence and flow of illegal immigrants would be acceptable. Naturally this
inquiry raises further problems such as distribution and local impact.
Yet these are precisely the types of questions that must be posed, with
full acknowledgement of the operative assumptions, before Congress designs a series of responsive law enforcement options with attendant costs.
Acceptability is not simply a statement of what is wished. Rather, it is a
rational calculation that takes into account a host of surrounding factors
such as human and civil rights, foreign policy consequences, and verifia44
ble impacts on the U.S. economy and unemployment.
Another alluring argument for employer sanctions is that experience
shows that the workplace is an efficient place to focus interior immigration law enforcement and that having employers screen workers for legality maintains this workplace locale and multiplies enforcement capacity
at minimal public cost. Much INS interior enforcement has concentrated on places of employment because it is not unusual for a given
employer to have more than one undocumented alien on his rolls. In
addition, fourth amendment issues appear to be less complex and volatile
when, for instance, a factory rather than an apartment, picnic, or street
gathering is raided without the owner's objection, with questioning being
based upon informant or observational information. 145 Finally, because
working without authorization is one of the common deportable offenses
for nonimmigrant visitors, 146 a workplace seizure provides direct evidence, which would not be available from a street arrest, of that out-of47
status activity for aliens who were admitted with inspection.
The notion, however, of enlisting employers in the fight against illegal aliens as a means of enforcing the law ignores fundamental aspects of
American society. While there are myriad health, safety, and employment standards that employers must adhere to, the government requires
143 Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Working Document, Review of Existing Studies of the Number of Illegal Residents in the United States, at 19 (January 1980)

(prepared for the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy). This estimate is not
an official estimate of the Census Bureau. The report states, "This review of the existing studies
on illegal residents in the United States finds that there are currently no reliable estimates of the
number of illegal residents in the country or of the net volume of illegal immigration to the
United States in any recent past period." Id at 18.
144 Claims for employer sanctions, such as David North's hypothesis that a million jobs will
open to American workers or Labor Secretary Ray Marshall's claim that removal of undocumented workers would drop the unemployment rate below four percent, require greater analytical support to be persuasive. See notes 133 & 135 supra.
145 See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
146 8 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)(9) (1976); see Pinella v. Board of Review, 155 N.J. Super. 307, 382
A.2d 924 (App. Div. 1978).
147 Aliens who enter without inspection are deportable for that act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2)
(1976), and the burden is on the alien to show "time, place and manner of entry," id. § 1361.
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all employers to actively participate in enforcement of the law with respect to their employees in only one area, taxation. Employer sanctions
would thus become only the second such general requirement. This obviously would be a major change in the relationship between government
and the people. The other obvious change caused by employer sanctions
would be that private persons will be asked to discriminate according to
a legal category, such as citizen or unlawful entrant. To date, the federal
government has been chary of establishing such intrusive labeling that
would erect barriers to labor market access. To the contrary, federal intervention in the labor market has generally followed the view that the
government has an obligation to protect access and ensure fairness, particularly when employment is at stake. 148 Justice Douglas stated: "The
right to work, I had assumed, was the most precious liberty that man
possesses. Man has indeed as much right to work as he has to live, to be
149
free, to own property."
Employer sanctions inevitably would lodge government between the
individual and most employment in a fashion much different from regulation according to civil rights standards which ensures the free play of
skill, opportunity, and fair market forces; employer sanctions are unrelated to a person's actual or potential economic contribution. The most
dramatic conclusion one reaches about employer sanctions is that they
are appropriate to nations with centrally-controlled economies. Economically, they are a national socialist measure; politically, they are totalitarian.
To illustrate what an extraordinary proposal employer sanctions
are, consider parallel sanctions which could be imposed on other entities
also in regular contact with a wide variety of people. Landlord sanctions, for example, would punish any landlord who rented housing to an
undocumented alien. The conservative rationale would be that undocumented aliens squeeze tight rental markets, particularly in cities where
they cluster, reducing the opportunity for citizens and other lawful residents to find good housing and resulting in higher rental fees. The liberal rationale wduld be that rapacious landlords are exploiting
undocumented aliens by threatening to report them to the INS unless
they pay inflated prices, live in overcrowded conditions, and do not report health and safety violations. Finally, the enforcement efficiency argument would be that, because everyone needs a place to live, shutting
off the possibility of shelter would deter most aliens who wish to come to
the United States without inspection or who plan to violate nonimmigrant visa terms. The same arguments could be raised for many other
entities sharing broad public contact: dentist sanctions, grocer sanctions,
148Se L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 427-55, 948-53 (1978).
149 Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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mechanic sanctions, and teacher sanctions.' 50 The police state consequences of such "scorched earth" proposals are clear.
Aside from tenuous assumptions and the danger of unthinkingly accepting colorable proposals, employer sanctions present the fundamental
question of how one identifies oneself. The key to employer sanctions is
creating a barrier to U.S. jobs that can be overcome only by those persons permitted to work. Though the barrier will be manned by employers, it must be constructed by the federal government in order to be
uniform nationwide. The federal government therefore would have to
provide an identity system that would enable employers to screen people
in or out of the labor market without error or discrimination.
This task is as complex as the United States itself. The United
States is a heterogeneous society and there are no obvious ways to distinguish a citizen from an immigrant or a nonimmigrant from an undocumented alien. No certainty about a person's nationality or immigration
status can be had from the physical appearance, dress, age, accent, English language skill, companions, or demeanor. Also, for the most part,
the INA does not govern a person's ordinary behavior. Most violations,
including working without INS or visa authority, are status offenses.
They turn on a person's legal status derived from the label of being
"alien." An individual whose nonimmigrant visa has expired is no different personally the day after it expired than he was the day before.
In addition, most INA violations are victimless. An alien who enters
illegally or who enters legally but works without authorization does not
harm anyone directly or suffer harm himself, except to the extent that he
is exploited within legal definition, suffers peonage, or feels anxiety that
his employer will report him to the INS and retain his backwages. It is
possible, of course, that society in general or aggregate groups of workers
may be harmed, though as noted earlier this harm is highly speculative
and rarely can be demonstrated as specific injury to a lawful worker or
job seeker. Because labor is legal, an undocumented alien who works
alongside a citizen commits through his labor no more of a labor offense,
as contrasted to an immigration offense, than does the citizen.
Consider the example of employer sanctions being applied to identical twins working side by side, one a U.S. citizen and the other an undocumented alien. Nothing in appearance or activity distinguishes one
from the other; yet, one is deportable and, under employer sanctions, his
employment could lead to punishing the employer. Therefore, to implement employer sanctions the government must develop a mechanism to
separate and distinguish the legal from the illegal worker. Without such
a mechanism, an employer inevitably will discriminate against citizens or
immigrants whom he believes to be illegal or alternatively will hire undocumented aliens who appear to be citizens. Without help, the em150 The Texas "school cases," Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tex. 1978), have
scorched earth sanctions rationales attached to the government's arguments.
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ployer's decisions thus will be either overinclusive or underinclusive as he
walks the line between employer sanctions and civil rights concerns.
Because the essence of a fair system is simple, unbiased identification, the government must face the task of inventing an identity system
in order for employer sanctions to work. For an employer to be punished
fairly for hiring someone illegally, he must commit an act he could have
avoided without breaching other laws that ensure fair hiring practices. If
an employer is held to a knowledge standard he must have means to
obtain that knowledge at minimal cost to his operations, including his
relationships with employees, applicants, and the community at large.
To avoid legitimizing employer discrimination against people who appear foreign, employer sanctions need either a strict knowledge standard
or a supportive identity mechanism that simultaneously prevents employers from engaging in and employees from experiencing illegal discrimination. If employers themselves are required, with penalties for
refusal, to enforce the law privately by rejecting applicants who are not
permitted to work, the federal government may need to establish an objective, fraud-proof identity system. To permit an employer to reject an
applicant on suspicion rather than certainty of illegal presence would not
only cause serious and legitimate social outcry, but would also subject
the employer to discrimination lawsuits.
Because the basic immigration interior enforcement questions are
identity and status, advocates of employer sanctions have devised a continuum of methods for identification.' 5' The identity continuum moves
from the most effective to the most porous. The identity systems proposed include a national work identity card, a centralized data bank, a
simple affidavit, and a multiplicity of identifiers. The most curious aspect of these methods is that the more effective they are, the more dangerous they become to the U.S. tradition of civil rights. Justice William
0. Douglas has observed:
Free movement by the citizen is of course as dangerous to a tyrant as free
expression of ideas or the right of assembly and it is therefore controlled
in most countries in the interest of security. That is why riding boxcars
carries extreme penalties in Communist lands. That is why the ticketing
matters under
of people and the use of identification papers are routine 152
totalitarian regimes, yet abhorrent in the United States.

Concurrently, the less effective methods, with less of a threat to civil
rights, are minimally useful to punish employers because they shift the
punitive action back to the alien. Under the "new hire reporting" propo151 The North comparison chart, see Table 2 infia, lays out the most talked about continuum. Behind this search for the solution is a sense that employer sanctions proponents believe
that designing a mechanistic system is the same as designing a law enforcement program. The
LEAA experience shows clearly that mechanical sophistication helps ease the job of policing but
does not replace the human judgment of officers and other analysts. Enforcement proposals,
like employer sanctions, must take into account the complex human factor in society to be
successful.
152 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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sal, for instance, the employer would become little more than an information-gathering arm of the government, and the punitive/deterrent
notions behind employer sanctions would disappear. Thus, as a proposal
becomes less effective, it no longer is one of "employer sanctions." Each
proposal, nevertheless, deserves individual scrutiny.
Table 2
Comparison of Four Alternative Systems to Discourage the
Employment of Undocumented Workers
(assumes passage of employer sanctions legislation)
ystMulti-

N~
Sseros
\Impacts N N

Work Permit

Call-In
Data Bank

New Hire
Reporting

minimal on

Document
Screening by
Employers
all new cmn-

most; a minori-

Impact on Legal Workers
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show card

t; no
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have to file applications

new employees
must fill out
half-page form

ployees must
show some documents to employer

Impact on Employers

all employers
must screen
new workers for
this card

all must make
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about new employees

employer must
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of form to government

substantial
decision-making
responsibility
such workers
more likely to
be excluded or
screened more
thoroughly
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on "Foreign
Looking"
Workers

none

none

such workers
more likely to
be excluded or
screened more
thoroughly
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(reworker's legitimacy)

Government

Government

Employer, as
audited off-site
by INS

Employer

yes

no

yes

no

least effective

Need for New
Document
Degree of Effectiveness

very effective

effective

effective to the
extent that reports are monitored, followed
up

Degree of Opposition
Expected

very substantial

substantial

substantial

substantial

most expensive

moderate cost

low cost

low cost

Cost to Coy-

ernment

D. North, Keeping Undocumented Workers Out Of The Work Force: Evaluation Of Alternative Strategies, Exhibit A (May 1978) (Center for Labor and Migration Studies, New
TransCentury Foundation, Washington, D.C.).

A.

The ID Card

The work identity card is the simplest, most efficient method for
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employers to screen workers. The government would issue a card to any
person wishing to enter the job market or change jobs if that person
could prove he is a citizen or an alien permitted to work. Any card
would have to allow for some variation of work right to reflect the law;
foreign students, for instance, are permitted to work no more than 20
hours per week with permission during the school year. If the Social
Security card were used, it would also have to be coded to allow for
separate, non-employment purposes, such as a foreign visitor without
work permission opening a bank account. Once a worker had a card, he
simply would present it to the employer who would verify that the applicant was the cardholder. Employers might verify the applicant's status
visually, by questioning, or by a machine that could, for example, check
the person's fingerprints against prints on the card. The employer would
then record this information and retain records for government checks.
An employer who did not ask for a card or who did not keep records
would be-liable for employer sanctions.
This method would be the purest employer sanctions system because
it focuses upon the employer's screening responsibilities. An employer
who did not take the steps of verification and record keeping would be
punished. Secondarily, the system would provide cause for INS employees to question workers. Because workers would not be required to carry
their cards with them daily, presumably they would have to be asked to
bring them for INS checks, or INS investigators would undertake questioning without the benefit of cards. 153 Employer sanctions would be
only a supportive mechanism for the principal concern, discouraging employment of illegal aliens.
The card raises several problems. First, once it became adequately
universal, perhaps within twenty years, its attractiveness for other control
purposes would be so strong that it would quickly become a national
identity card.' 54 Second, though its proponents claim it would be hard
to counterfeit or tamper with, as a passport to the U.S. labor market in a
world increasingly strapped for relatively well paying jobs, it would become so valuable that organized crime surely would find it a lucrative
field. The Federal Advisory Committee on False Identification noted
precisely this possibility of attendant corruption and recommended
55
against a national identification document.'
Third, for a number of years, some citizens would find it difficult to
153 One should keep in mind that only persons hired after the system went into effect would
have cards.
154 See U.S. COMMIsSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL
RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 65-70 (1980). With two dissents, the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights strongly opposed such a card. "Congress should nol enact legislation for the development and implementation of a compulsory national identity card or work permit system."
Id at 74 (emphasis in original). See generally J. RULE, D. MCADAM, L. STEARNS & D. UGLOW,
THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY (1980) [hereinafter cited as J. RULE & D. MCADAM].
155 FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FALSE IDENTIFICATION, THE CRIMINAL USE OF

FALSE IDENTIFICATION (Nov. 1979).
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get a card because they are not part of the record system in this country.
Also, citizens who are already marginal to the economy may be forced
fully underground both from lack of knowledge and fear of government.
Fourth, it is probable that the only prosecutions will be brought
against those employers who actually have hired undocumented aliens.
Prosecutors are unlikely to charge employers who do not ask for cards, do
not keep records, but only hire citizens knowing the charges would be
subject to extensive litigation and ultimately to jury nullification.
Finally, to the extent that prosecutions are selective and directed not
to the employer but rather to the employee, hiring discrimination will
develop. Only persons who appear to be foreign will be checked by employers and if any doubts emerge they will be turned away. For example, an Anglo who forgets his card might be hired and told to bring it
tomorrow, whereas an Hispanic who forgets it will not be hired even
tentatively.

B

The Data Bank

To avoid the traditional American fear of internal passports associ56
ated with an ID card, a centralized data bank has been proposed.'
This computer bank would store information on every person who might
be in the workforce or who wishes to enter it. Some proposals call for the
merger of existing data systems such as military records, social security
records, and even Internal Revenue Service personal identifying data.
Other proposals call for establishing a new system that would record the
essential data on a person who comes to the government for labor clearance. Such data may include name, birthplace, birth date, mother's
maiden name, and elementary school. It might also include fingerprints
if technology permitted. The system would not include address because
it quickly might become obsolete.
Although the political perceptions may be somewhat different from
those associated with ID cards, similar arguments to those concerning ID
cards apply to data banks, particularly as police cars increasingly become equipped with computer terminals. A card system, too, may be
linked to a computer if the ID card has to be checked out, which would
make the data bank more than a passive repository of information. In
some ways, a data bank is more ominous than a card system for it can be
used to obtain information on a person without the person's knowledge.
Thus, the privacy concerns of the data bank proposal are large.
156 The idea of a universal identifier social security card has been active since the Social
Security Board was established in 1935. Se J. RULE & D. McADAM, supra note 154, at 99-100,
142-45.
Every official who has overseen the system, including Patricia Roberts Harris, Secretary of
Heaith and Human Services in the Carter Administration and, by virtue of her position, one of
the sixteen Commissioners of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, has
sought to protect the Social Security System from such proposals. Success has been mixed.
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New Hi're Reporting

Here, the employee would sign an affidavit, such as the one in Form
1, saying he is a citizen or a legal alien and, if the latter, would provide
his documentation. Some proposals call for all employees to present documentation. 57 The weakness of this system is obvious. It is open to
abuse by employees using false documents and by employers making
judgments about people and documents that they are not equipped or
trained to make. The enforcement focus shifts from the employer to the
employee. The government provides virtually no screening assistance to
the employer, making it unlikely that prosecutions will be brought
against anyone other than the flagrant violator who has determinedly
hired undocumented aliens. "Employer sanctions" might essentially be
replaced in nomenclature by "employer license to discriminate."
D. Multiple Documents
In this proposed system, a range of documents would be authorized
for employer scrutiny, and no centralized government reporting would
be required, though records must be kept for INS on-site inspection.
These records might include passports, other government-issued ID
cards, and birth certificates. This system, of course, easily could be penetrated if only because the United States has no uniform, secure birth
record system. Cheating would be fairly widespread, although less sophisticated foreigners might be deterred from entering the country.
Again, the concept is based on employee screening rather than employer
sanctions.
The proposal includes telling employees that the form will be sent to
the INS for verification. 158 The assumption is that many undocumented
aliens will be frightened away; but there is real reason to believe that
legal aliens might be equally concerned. Employer returns of employee
records would be checked in two ways: (1) data on employee forms
would be randomly verified, for example by cross-checking with military
records, and (2) the records of a particular employer or type of business
might be verified first through existing data banks and then through visits to the employer where personnel records would be checked against the
filed employee identity forms and discrepancies checked further by
means of questioning employees.

157 See D. North & J. Wagner, Enforcing The Immigration Law: A Review Of The Options, at 59-71 (Draft, June 1980) (Center for Labor and Migration Studies, New TransCentury
Foundation, Washington, D.C.) (prepared for Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee
Policy).
158 The authors wonder whether the INS is capable of verifying any documents given its
record of losing files which the authors and others have experienced.
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Form 1
New Hire Reporting Form
DATE OF HIRE
NAME OF EMPLOYER

EMPLOYER NUMBER

ADDRESS

TELEPHONE NUMBER
$

TYPE OF BUSINESS

WAGE PER WK/HR

NAME OF WORKER

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

ADDRESS

(

/

)/

DATE OF BIRTH

TELEPHONE NUMBER
DO YOU POSSESS ONE OF THE FOLLOWING?
U.S.
PASSPORT

yes

U.S.
no CITIZEN CARD
(form 1-197)

.yes __no

(if yes, note number)
DISCHARGE FROM U.S.
ARMED FORCES yes __no

If one or more of the above are answered "yes" do not complete the following section.
COMPLETE BLOCK BELOW CORRESPONDING TO YOUR STATUS IN THE U.S.
0 United States Citizen, Native Born or by Derivation
Place of Birth
Mother's Maiden Name
0

Naturalized Citizen

A-Number

o

Permanent Resident Alien

A-Number

0

Other - Describe status below; if you have a nonimmigrant visa, indicate visa class (A-1,
I,7'-1, etc.) and date on which your authorized stay expires.

I, the employee, certify, under penalty of perjury, that I am entitled to work in the United
States and that the information given is true and accurate.
Employee Signature

Date

D. North, Keeping Undocumented Workers Out Of The Workforce: Evaluation Of Alternative Strategies, Exhibit C (May 1978) (Center for Labor and Migration Studies, New TransCentury Foundation, Washington, D.C.).

E.

Analysis of ProposedIdentiftcation Systems

Although each system has its unique drawbacks, ranging from laying the groundwork for a totalitarian police state to obvious inefficacy,
they all share in common little regard for civil rights. Discrimination
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will be the hallmark of any employer sanctions scheme and that fact
59
alone is sufficient reason to reject the proposals.1
When people rather than documents are being hired, there is no
such thing as an objective verification program. Documentation must be
evaluated in light of the person who presents it, so employer or government screener subjectivity will never be eliminated. Not only will job
applicants who look foreign be scrutinized more rigorously and possibly
rejected if screening becomes too costly in terms of time spent by employers or government personnel, but workers who frequently change employers will experience many screenings and thus disproportionate risk of
employer or government error. These workers are predominantly minorities and women. 160 In addition, workers from lower class minority
groups who have been marginal to many of society's data systems, or at
least to those identification systems acceptable to employer sanctions
screeners, may have difficulty documenting their legality for employers
and thus may experience more frequent referral for government review.
Furthermore, any temporary permit system meant to offset bureaucratic
confusion and delay would not only risk error and frustration and perhaps even deportation of citizens, but also would decrease employment
prospects with employers who do not recognize or trust temporary documents or who refuse to risk hiring someone who may have difficulty being documented. 16 1 Racial, ethnic, and alienage characteristics will be
used to direct this group of persons to the government bureaucracies.
Employer perceptions toward both individuals and the program will
be very important. To the extent program effectiveness depends upon
vigilance and employer fear of punishment, and vigilance in turn means
skepticism toward certain people, anyone who is either "foreign-looking" or unfamiliar will have a harder time than an "American-looking"
person in removing the government constructed barriers to labor market
access. ' 6 2 The employer who wishes to "play it safe" inevitably will be
overinclusive in his rejections and referrals for government screening.
159 The authors are indebted to many observers of the processes of the Select Commission
on Immigration and Refugee Policy, including Carolyn Waller of InterpreterReleases; David Carliner of Carliner and Gordon; John Shattuck, Legislative Director of the American Civil Liberties Union; and Carol Stepick and Dale Frederick Swartz of the Alien Rights Law Project, who
have found the employer sanctions proposals to be without true merit, both broadly and in their
specifics, and dangerous in their civil liberties consequences. We also appreciate the work of the
Georgetown University Law Center's Institute of Public Representation, Amita Pandya, Douglas Parker, and Erick Glitzenstein, so thoughtfully presented in their paper on employer sanctions, supra note 134.
160 See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY REPORT-1973 PATTERNS FOR MINORITIES AND WOMEN IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY

xvii (1975).
161 A person who might have difficulty being documented is not always equivalent to an
undocumented alien. Some citizens may be difficult to document. For instance, a person born
outside a hospital in a rural area might never have obtained a birth certificate or a Social
Security card, so it would be very difficult for him to prove citizenship via documents.
162 Lawful immigrants often are generally classified as "illegals" by persons concerned
about illegal immigration problems. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY (October 1980).
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Any administrative system like "New Hire Reporting" that leads to
INS on-site inspection following paper review will, simultaneously
prompt employers to err on the side of caution so as to avoid INS interruptions and permit INS officers themselves to select persons for questioning, ostensibly from the "objectivity" of documents. In reality,
however, the selection will be influenced by the person's appearance,
thereby raising substantial questions under the fourth amendment standards of reasonable suspicion.1 63 Under an identity card system, INS
spot checks and raids will cause some employees to carry their cards to
work and perhaps cause employers to demand that they do so. If this
becomes the norm, state and local police officers may expect cards to be
carried, especially by foreign-looking persons, and treat them as internal
passports. Further, legislative and regulatory standards might soon be
established permitting state and local officials to require all travelers during declared emergencies, ranging from riots to blackouts to high crime
zones, to carry their ID cards, with arrest and other penalties for noncompliance.
Regardless of the employer sanctions system one chooses, violations
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and of the fifth and fourteenth amendments are possible. When subjective hiring results in discrimination against the disadvantaged and the minority' 6 4 so that access
is frustrated by reasons unrelated to job qualification, 165 Title VII may
be violated. To the extent that persons are barred from competing
equally due to suspicions raised about them by a government labeling
program, they may have been deprived of liberty and property without
due process1 66 and may also belong to similarly situated groups being
discriminated against in contravention of equal protection principles. 167
Finally, if discrimination is as deep as anticipated and strikes against
"insular minorities,"' 16 8 courts will apply a "strict scrutiny" test, 69 to the
cause of these problems. It is hoped that any employer sanctions scheme
will fail to be implemented; a permanent injunction could be obtained
against any expenditure of funds on the ground that proponents did not
163 INA offenses often invoke criminal as well as civil penalties (deportation is a civil penalty, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976); Jolley v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 441 F.2d 1245 (5th
Cir.), cert. denid,, 404 U.S. 946 (1971)), so the fourth amendment cannot be disregarded. See
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 41 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975);
Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
164 See, e.g., Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972).
165 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
166 See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
167 See text accompanying notes 24-28, 50-60 supra.
168United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 153 & n.4 (1938) (dictum)

(Stone, J.).

169 See, e.g., In re Grifflths, 413 U.S. 713, 721-22 (1973); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 192 (1964).
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meet the "least restrictive alternative" test1 70 and could not argue successfully that such an intrusion into the domestic labor market was immune to challenge as a congressional exercise of plenary power to
regulate immigration. 171 This is because, regardless of the identity modality suggested for employer sanctions, sanctions remain but one option
model among a group focused on interior enforcement. Alternatives include enforcing a range of labor laws directed against worker exploitation and toward establishing a professional, legally-trained police force,
perhaps within INS, solely responsible for enforcing the immigration
laws with no involvement of other government service agencies. Moreover, even if not clearly unconstitutional, Congress should strongly consider the policies behind Title VII and the equal protection provisions of
the U.S. Constitution when making any policy on employee sanctions
proposals.
Thus, employer sanctions need scrutiny both as means and as ends.
The ends concern advocate assumptions about the undocumented alien
"problem" and its deterrence. The means concern law enforcement
principles and identity schemes. Inherent in employer sanctions proposals is an unsettling disregard for American traditions respecting individual rights and effective and fair law enforcement. Claims made for this
"scorched earth" idea are so unsubstantiated that the idea itself of employer sanctions is inherently unsound. Regardless, the means needed to
implement employer sanctions so threaten U.S. traditions that the idea
should be rejected on that basis alone.
VII.

Conclusion

This article is as much about attitudes as it is about policies and
proposals. Although immigration has been a central theme of the
United States for over two centuries, immigration policy has been a
backwater. The Immigration and Naturalization Service today, for example, is asked to do a monumental though ill defined job with antiquated tools and insufficient budget and staff. The Visa Office of the
Department of State has only recently begun to use computers. During
its twelve years of existence, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration had no programs to undertake research or to develop technical
competence in immigration law enforcement. The Immigration and Nationality Act is also likely to remain a confusing patchwork, built upon a
law devised during the McCarthy era, because of the Select Commission's avoidance of fully meeting its mandated responsibility to "simplify
and clarify" the Act.
Given this neglect, it is little wonder that the contemporary surfacing of international migration as an overriding global issue like popula170 See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); United Mine Workers v.

Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
171 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941).
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tion growth and resource depletion is met by panic. Like them, it is
second only to nuclear war as a worldchanging force. International migration is also a symptom of population and resource pressures, of political instability, and of human rights violations as well as being a direct
reflection of those affirmative desires for a better life that have brought
most current U.S. citizens or their ancestors to this nation.
Americans are a "people of all people" and therefore sense the economic and cultural benefits of immigration. Few U.S. citizens would
wish to close the doors of the United States, even if that could be done
easily. Nevertheless, many current immigration policy proposals would
require fundamental restructuring of traditional personal relationships in
order to obtain control over undocumented foreign migration into the
United States. Structuring employment and other relationships to solve
the "illegal alien problem" is a tactic having not only questionable utility
but also dangerous tendencies for fostering hostility, disloyalty, and distrust among U.S. residents. This is an enormous price to pay for an uncertain resolution to an as yet poorly understood global problem. The
American people should find "scorched earth" proposals offensive and
extremely dangerous to the country. There is a crisis, but it is one of
confidence, of expertise, and of experience. Immigration policy from
both domestic and international perspectives must be made a priority
matter. If it is not, "scorched earth" policies may be the quickest answer
to the enduring unsettlement of fundamental U.S. traditions of freedom
such as privacy, travel, and association. Were the United States to permit such perversion of its beliefs and institutions, the country surely will
reap in the next century what is sown today.

